Arendt's generic label for the subject matter of international criminal law is "crimes against humanity," because (like Jaspers) she believed that crimes become international only when they offend all of humanity. 7 Her usage, obviously, bears little relation to standard legal terminology, in which "crime against humanity" is not the generic name for international crimes, but rather the specific name of one category of international crimes, alongside the other core crimes of aggression, war crimes, and genocide. 8 "Core crimes" is the closest we get to a generic label for all of them. Making matters more confusing, in EJ Arendt treats the term "crime against humanity" as a nearsynonym for "genocide," and she completely ignores the legal definitions in the Convention on Genocide and the Nuremberg Charter. 9 Arendt's unconventional use of conventional terminology may annoy legal readers and convince them that EJ is legally naive. That would be unfortunate. In my view, no theorist has thought more perceptively than Arendt about the basis of She considered genocide to be the paradigm crime against humanity, not as defined in law but in the literal sense conveyed by the words themselves: a crime that offends all humanity. 7 Jaspers: "This case concerns all of humanity." Jaspers to Arendt, Dec. 16, 1960, in Kohler & Sahner, supra note 4, p. 413. Arendt: "The concept of hostis humani generis-however one translates it, but not: crime against humanness; but rather, against humanity-is more or less indispensable to the trial….I think we are in basic agreement on these points…." Arendt to Jaspers, Feb. 5, 1961, in Kohler & Sahner, supra note 4, p. 423. 8 Diane Marie Amann has pointed out to me that the French criminal code classifies genocide side by side with "autres crimes contre l'humanité" within a title labeled "Des crimes contre l'humanité." France, Code Pénal, Livre II, titre Ier, sous-titre Ier, <http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070719&dateTexte=2010092> (visited Oct. 15, 2010). Arendt's usage may well seem less unconventional to francophone jurists. 9 She likewise ignores war crimes and the crime of aggression, perhaps because they played almost no role in the Eichmann case. Eichmann was not charged with aggression and only one of the fifteen counts of the indictment against him was for a war crime, namely "the persecution, expulsion and murder of the Jewish population of the countries occupied by the Germans and the other countries of the Axis, … in the course of fulfilling his functions as specified in the First Count." Prosecutor v. Eichmann Indictment, Eighth Count, <http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/people/e/eichmann-adolf/transcripts/Sessions/Session-001-02.html> (visited July 23, 2010). In other words, Eichmann's war crimes were factually indistinguishable from genocide. international criminal liability in mass atrocities, when thousands of perpetrators commit acts that we label "manifestly unlawful," without considering how thoroughly our label begs the question of why it wasn't manifest to the perpetrators.
I. "The Challenge of the Unprecedented" Why did Arendt think that Eichmann's crimes "cannot even be adequately represented either in legal terms or in political terms," as she put it to Jaspers in the letter quoted above? For Arendt, the fundamental fact about the modern crime of genocide is the same as the fundamental fact about European totalitarianism: both confound the usual categories we use to make sense of moral, legal, and political life. In The Origins of Totalitarianism she castigates political science for "denying the outrageous, deducing the unprecedented from precedents, … explaining phenomena by such analogies and generalities that the impact of reality and the shock of experience are no longer felt." 10 Arendt leveled a similar complaint against the legalisms of the Israeli court, which in her view "never rose to the challenge of the unprecedented …, [but rather] buried the proceedings under a flood of precedents …." 11 To take one central example, we find Arendt asserting that legal discussions of the act of state defense "gave the illusion that the altogether unprecedented could be judged according to precedents …." 12 10 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 2 nd ed., (Meridian, New York,1958) The traditional act of state defense rests on a conception of raison d'état grounded in political necessity. "In a normal political and legal system, such crimes occur as an exception to the rule …. However … in a state founded upon criminal principles, the situation is reversed." 13 Law becomes crime and crime becomes law. 14 Under such circumstances, non-criminal acts, like Himmler's 1944 order to halt the genocide, "become a concession to necessity," 15 while crime becomes a matter of duty that loses "the quality by which most people recognize it-the quality of temptation." 16 In other words, a criminal state turns the moral and legal universe upside-down, which is why an Eichmann, "who is in actual fact hostis generis humani, commits his crimes under circumstances that make it well-nigh impossible for him to know or to feel that he is doing wrong." 17 To Arendt these circumstances signaled "the totality of the moral collapse the Nazis caused in respectable European society-not only in Germany, but in almost all countries …." 18 Legal precedents from normal polities offer illusory guidance when a criminal regime turns the background morality of society upside down. That is why the Jerusalem judges, "too good, and perhaps also too conscious of the very foundations of their profession … missed the greatest moral and even legal challenge of the whole case," namely that "under the conditions of the Third Reich only 'exceptions' could be expected to act 'normally. '" 19 In reconstructing this argument I have quoted Arendt's own language liberally, in part to exhibit stylistic features that enraged EJ's critics, namely her superior tone and her love affair with paradoxes. Her paradoxes, in the eyes of her critics, led her to minimize Eichmann's individual culpability, defying respectable common sense. (As I shall show later, this completely misunderstands Arendt's position, which is not to minimize his culpability but to rest it on something other than subjective mens rea.) Attributing Eichmann's baffling lack of conscience to the moral collapse of his society spoils the morality play of the criminal trial, in which a tribunal representing decent people isolates, condemns, and purges the cancer cells, the deviants. In Arendt's retelling, it turns out that decent people might not be so decent because criminals might not be so deviant.
Organizers of tribunals stage their morality plays in order to spare us the need for acknowledging how normal some great criminals really were.
Arendt strongly believed that international criminal trials must never be staged as morality plays, or for any other ulterior political reasons. "I held and hold the opinion that this trial had to take place in the interests of justice and nothing else." 20 That required, for example, excluding general evidence about the Holocaust or the sufferings of the Jews unless it directly implicated Eichmann, and rejecting efforts to structure the trial to teach political "lessons" either to the Israeli public or the world at large. One of Arendt's major conclusions in EJ is that although focusing the trial on the Holocaust rather than on Eichmann was indeed Ben Gurion's goal and that of the prosecutor (who Arendt describes in scornful terms), the judges mostly succeeded in preventing this from happening. 21 20 Ibid., p. 286.
Her justice-centered view contrasts with that of writers who emphasize the political, didactic aims of international criminal trials within the larger project of post- conflict peacemaking. In her view, the exclusive focus on the guilt or innocence of defendants, rather than on teaching the public about the horrors of the Holocaust, is essential so that "all the cogs in the machinery, no matter how insignificant, are in court forthwith transformed back into perpetrators, that is to say, into human beings." 22 This is how she avoids the danger of minimizing Eichmann's culpability. Under the pressures of inflation, unemployment, and civil wars, political structures that had allowed ethnic groups to lead a common life within territorial states collapsed. As these structures disintegrated, respect for human rights disintegrated with them, and entire groups were officially dehumanized and removed from the protection of law, the first step toward mass extermination. Elites allied themselves with the mob in their "justified disgust … with the outlook and moral standards of the bourgeoisie." 24 With the declaration that entire races or classes are mortal enemies, the root conception of humanism-that all human beings belong to a shared commonwealth (an idea that goes back to the Stoics)-disappears. Carl Schmitt perfectly expresses this point of view in his cynical slogan, "whoever invokes humanity wants to cheat." What these intellectuals failed to realize was that their supposed unmasking of bourgeois morality as a hypocritical cover for crime would be taken literally by totalitarian rulers, who declared crime to be a duty and decency to be a crime. 25 Instead of humanity, there is only us and them, friend and enemy, and the destruction of the enemy is the ultimate meaning of politics. In Arendt's diagnosis, precisely this outlook paved the way to crimes against humanity in a very literal sense. As she put it in an imaginary sentencing speech that the Jerusalem court might have delivered to Eichmann: we find that no one, that is, no member of the human race, can be expected to want to share the earth with you. This is the reason, and the only reason, you must hang." 26 Arendt's curiously fussy phrase "no one, that is, no member of the human race" underlines how strongly she believed the community that was judging Eichmann to consist of all human beings everywhere. The "crime against humanity" is, quite simply, the unwillingness to share the earth with all the peoples who inhabit it.
II. The World Turned Upside Down
It might be objected that even if Arendt's genealogy of totalitarianism is accurate, it is too closely tied to Europe in the mid-twentieth century to be of use to contemporary international criminal law. This objection is mistaken. Arendt's most important point concerns the reversal of deviance and normality, of rule and exception, that creates the condition for mass atrocity. Even if the historical pathway to the inversion was very different in 1994 Rwanda than in 1942 Germany, the inversion itself is crucial for understanding both genocides-and for understanding why normal legal categories might offer a poor lens through which to view perpetrators. The inversion is hardly unique to Europe between the wars. 27 Whenever a state invokes emergency powers in the face of a real or imagined existential threat, it stands on the brink of inverting rule and exception; this is the meaning of Schmitt's famous aphorism "Sovereign is he who decides on the exception" 28 26 Arendt, supra note 6, p. 279.
-for, after all, in a normal state, the sovereign is he who decides on the rules. 27 The inversion of normality and decency during periods in which people commit mass atrocity is a major theme of Mark Drumbl's recent book Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007), a book that draws heavily on Arendt's observation. 28 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, George Schwab (trans.), (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2006) p. 5.
III. Jurisdiction and "Humanity"
Jaspers objected to Israel trying Eichmann because "[t]his case concerns all humanity …." 29 He proposed a foolishly simplistic idea: It would be wonderful to do without the trial altogether and make it instead a process of examination and clarification. The goal would be the best possible objectification of the historical facts. The end result would not be the judges'
sentence, but certainty about the facts, to the extent such certainty can be attained. 30 In other words, Jaspers wanted a truth commission, because the world lacks "a court that, as a representative of humanity, is competent to judge a crime against humanity …." 31 For that reason, he proposed turning Eichmann and the evidence over to the United Nations, although he was sure that "[t]he UN would cite legal objections to wriggle out of this situation." 32 Arendt disagreed with the truth commission proposal, and anticipated arguments that would eventually be made on behalf of the ICC and universal jurisdiction:
The only possibility seems to be to attach to the International Court at The Hague a criminal court for hostes generis humani that would be competent to try individuals regardless of nationality. As long as such a court does not exist, international law holds 29 Jaspers to Arendt, Dec. 16, 1960 , in Kohler and Saner, supra note 4, p. 413. He also fretted that "Israel may come away from it looking bad no matter how objective the conduct of the trial." Jaspers to Arendt, Dec. 12, 1960, p. 410; see also Jaspers to Arendt, Dec. 16, 1960, p. 413 ("Judgments passed by the victors on the vanquished have, in the past, been regarded as political actions and distinct from legal ones.") Arendt too worried that the trial might become politicized. Arendt to Jaspers, Dec. 23, 1960, p. 416. 30 Jaspers to Arendt, Dec. 16, 1960, ibid., p. 413. He repeats this "utopian suggestion" in his letter of Jan. 3, 1961, p. 420, and again in his letter of Feb. 14, 1961, where he calls it a "simpleminded fantasy," p. 424. 31 Jaspers to Arendt, Feb. 14, 1961, ibid., p. 424. 32 Jaspers to Arendt, Dec. 16, 1960, ibid., p. 413. that any court in the world is competent-so why not Israel? Legally, Israel couldn't even claim it isn't competent. 33 She adds: "Don't misunderstand me: I would be all in favor of an international court with appropriate powers." 34 In its absence, Israel could legitimately seize and try Eichmann because he was "an outlaw-a hostis generis humanis, the way pirates used to be." 35 In the same letter, she cites the passive personality principle as another basis for Israel to try Eichmann. By the time she wrote EJ, though, she came to doubt her earlier jurisdictional arguments. She rejects passive personality because it "unfortunately implies that criminal proceedings are initiated by the government in the name of the victims." 36 This blurs an essential difference between a civil and criminal proceeding. The former rectifies injuries to a victim, while the latter concerns injuries to the entire community, inflicted on the victim-in this case "a crime against humanity, perpetrated on the body of the Jewish people" rather than a crime against the Jewish people. 37 This argument against passive personality is subtle and plausible. Her argument against universal jurisdiction is less compelling. A few weeks after her first letter about jurisdiction, she writes to Jaspers, "My pirate theory won't do." 38 33 Arendt to Jaspers, Dec. 23, 1960, ibid., p. 416.
Pirates by definition are private actors, which would make piracy solely a crime against the victims. Employing the same reasoning she used to reject passive personality, she rejects the pirate analogy: 34 Ibid. 35 Id. at 414. 36 Arendt, supra note 6, p. 260. 37 Ibid., p. 269; see also pp. 7, 261. Eichmann was indicted under an Israeli statute concerning crimes against the Jewish people, but the statute gives this term a legal definition adapted from the definitions of genocide and the crime of genocide in the Convention on Genocide. 38 Arendt to Jaspers, Feb. 5, 1961, in Kohler and Saner, supra note 4, p. 423. "although the crime at issue was committed primarily against the Jews, it is in no way limited to the Jews or the Jewish question." 39 In my view, Arendt was too fixated on the historical connection between the concept of hostis generis humanis and piracy. 40 Curiously, it is now she rather than the court that seems overly attached to precedent, wrongly rejecting her initial insight that horrific crimes can offend all humanity and therefore can justify universal criminal jurisdiction even though they have nothing to do with piracy. This seems like mere failure of imagination on her part. 41 In EJ she rejects the "analogy between genocide and piracy" because the Genocide Convention rejected universal jurisdiction. 42 This is a surprisingly formalist argument; in fact it was one of the defense arguments in the Eichmann trial. The Israeli court had a wholly adequate rejoinder, which Arendt overlooked: the Genocide Convention sets territoriality as the minimum requirement for genocide jurisdiction, but nothing prevents states from establishing other forms of jurisdiction in addition. 43 Having rejected passive personality and universal jurisdiction, Arendt proposed her own alternative, which is far more eccentric: 39 42 Arendt, supra note 6, p. 262. She is referring to Article 6, which provides that either the territorial state where the genocide was committed or a competent international tribunal can try the crime of genocidewhich was, in fact, a weakened alternative to universal jurisdiction. Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Iran had proposed universal jurisdiction, but several powerful states opposed it and prevailed. William A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000) pp. 355-58. 43 Prosecutor v. Eichmann, supra note 41, paras. 23-25.
Israel could easily have claimed territorial jurisdiction if she had only explained that 'territory,' as the law understands it, is a political and a legal concept, and not merely a geographical term. It relates not so much, and not primarily, to a piece of land as to the space between individuals in a group whose members are bound to, and at the same time separated and protected from, each other by all kinds of relationships, based on a common language, religion, a common history, customs, and laws. 44 True, there are examples in law of special territorial jurisdictions not tied to "a piece of land"-the most obvious is a ship on the high seas, which is in the territorial jurisdiction of its flag state. 45 What Arendt had in mind was a connection entirely unique to the Jews and the state of Israel: she explains that "the Jewish people had … created and maintained its own specific in-between space throughout the long centuries of dispersion,"
It is equally true that territorial jurisdiction is a legal rather than geographical concept. But declaring that territorial jurisdiction bears no essential connection to territory is farfetched. It is also unnecessary. 46 and apparently she believes that this is why the Jewish state could assert jurisdiction once it came into existence. The argument itself is not fanciful: in fact, the Jerusalem court used exactly this argument about the connection between Israel and the Diaspora to justify taking jurisdiction under the protective principle. 47
To summarize: Arendt, in accord with Jaspers, believed that the grounds of jurisdiction suitable for international crime must be limited to those appropriate to crimes The fanciful part is the claim that such jurisdiction is in any sense territorial. 44 Arendt, supra note 6, pp. 262-63. 45 For examples in U.S. law, see 18 U.S.C. § 7. 46 Arendt, supra note 6, pp. 263. 47 Prosecutor v. Eichmann, supra note 41, paras. 34-35. Curiously, Arendt makes no mention of the protective principle as a possible source of jurisdiction. that offend against all humanity. On principle, the correct forum would therefore be an international tribunal; second best would be a national court exercising universal jurisdiction. Eventually Arendt rejected universal jurisdiction, but for weak reasons. Her argument for avoiding passive personality jurisdiction is stronger: passive personality "localizes" the crime to an offense against its victims, and therefore misses the sense in which the crime offends all of humanity, and in which a domestic court serves as a proxy for humanity rather than its own state's nationals.
IV. Genocide and Group Identity
As I mentioned, EJ uses the terms "genocide" and "crimes against humanity"
interchangeably, in disregard of significant differences in their legal definitions. One reason we have seen is that Arendt uses the term "crime against humanity" in a nontechnical way, to designate a crime that offends all of humanity.
She explains what she has in mind when she distinguishes the crimes of expulsion and genocide.
Expulsion of nationals … is already an offense against humanity, if by "humanity" we understand no more than the comity of nations …. It was when the Nazi regime declared that the German people … wished to make the entire Jewish people disappear from the face of the earth that the new crime, the crime against humanity-in the sense of a crime "against the human status," or against the very nature of mankind-appeared ….
[Genocide] is an attack on human diversity as such, that is, upon a characteristic of the "human status" without which the very words "mankind" or "humanity" would be devoid of meaning. 48 At first glance, Arendt's reference to "human diversity as such" makes her reasoning sound remarkably similar to Raphaël Lemkin's argument for singling out genocide as a distinctive crime. For Lemkin, national or ethnic groups as such are essential to humanity, because they have value over and above the individuals who make them up.
Lemkin emphasizes the contributions that members of different national groups have made to world culture: the Jews produced Einstein and Spinoza, the Poles Copernicus, Chopin, and Curie; the Czechs, Huss and Dvorak; the Greeks, Plato and Socrates; the Russians, Tolstoy and Shostakovich. 49 Contrary to the initial impression of similarity, though, Arendt's approach breaks sharply with Lemkin's. Her own views about the value of groups have nothing to do with their cultural contributions, and indeed she finds the emphasis on geniuses belonging to minority groups morally repugnant.
Because Lemkin focused on the contributions of groups to civilization, he insisted that the law must protect groups by criminalizing the intentional effort to destroy a group (national, ethnic, racial, or religious) as such. That, of course, is precisely what the legal definition of genocide does, and its focus on intent to destroy groups "as such" is the feature that distinguishes genocide from the crime against humanity of extermination. 50 48 Arendt, supra note 6, pp. 268-69.
What she means by diversity is individual 49 Raphaël Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, 1944) p. 91. The list is Lemkin's own. 50 Arendt, supra note 6, pp. 132-34 (criticizing preferential treatment of Jewish elites). "There are more than a few people, especially among the cultural elite, who still publicly regret the fact that Germany sent uniqueness, not group diversity. In The Human Condition, she defines the key term "plurality" in individualist terms: "In man, otherness, which he shares with everything that is, and distinctness, which he shares with everything alive, becomes uniqueness, and human plurality is the paradoxical plurality of unique beings." 51 (Paradoxical, because Arendt also emphasizes human equality.) This is notably different from standard usage in American political science, where "pluralism" means group pluralism-a usage closer to Lemkin's. Although in EJ she chooses the word "diversity" rather than "plurality," she clearly means the same thing: both words designate the defining characteristic of humanity, which lies in the human condition of individual difference from all one's peers. 52 At this point it will be useful to examine Arendt's own views about identity groups and identity politics. She scorned romantic nationalism, which "holds a nation to be an eternal organic body, the product of inevitable natural growth of inherent qualities," and which "explains peoples, not in terms of political organizations, but in terms of biological superhuman qualities."
In this connection, her earlier-quoted argument that trials must focus exclusively on the perpetrator, because only that turns him from a cog in a machine into a human being, turns out to be no exaggeration. 53 Einstein packing, without realizing that it was a much greater crime to kill little Hans Cohn from around the corner, even though he was no genius." Ibid., p. 134. At bottom, she wholly rejects the communitarian thesis that attachments to groups give us our identity and creates pre-political obligations of loyalty. This rejection comes out most clearly in her exchange of letters about EJ with 51 Arendt, supra note 1, p. 176. 52 Ibid., p. 175. 53 Hannah Arendt, 'Zionism Reconsidered', in Jerome Kohn & Ron H. Feldman, (eds.), Hannah Arendt, The Jewish Writings (Schocken, New York, 2007) pp. 343, 366-67. In a 1933 letter to Jaspers, she remarked that every use of a phrase like "the German character" "is almost identical with misuse." Arendt to Jaspers, Jan. 6, 1933, Kohler and Saner, supra note 4, p. 18. Gershom Scholem (the great scholar of Jewish mysticism). 54 Scholem was deeply offended by Arendt's tone as well as her criticisms of the wartime Jewish leadership and the Israelis. He chided her for lack of "Herzenstakt"-i.e., lack of heart-and told her that, as "wholly a daughter of our people" she should have been more circumspect. 55 Delivering a speech in Hamburg, in 1959, however, Arendt claims that to reply "I am a Jew" would just be a pose. And surely she is right-it would be cheap victimology, said only to make her German audience squirm. Differences in political situation define differences in the speech acts performed by ascriptions of ethnicity. Thus the utterance "I am a Jew" can be factually true, false as a statement about essence or identity ("when I use the word 'Jew' I do not mean to suggest any special kind of human being"), and politically indeterminate, performing entirely different speech acts depending on the circumstances. Arendt claims that group identification becomes politically indispensable in circumstances of persecution because "one can resist only in terms of the identity that is under attack." This is not an "essentialist" claim about groups constituting identity. Nor is it Lemkin's claim about the value of groups "as such."
Arendt is no liberal individualist. She notes approvingly that the Romans, "perhaps the most political people we have known, used the words 'to live' and 'to be among men' … as synonyms." 62 But she distinguished sharply between the human being as a political and a social animal. 63 For Arendt, the significance of group identity lies in the group's participation in political action, not in its social affinities. That is why she defended Israel against one of the chief accusations of its pre-independence opponents, that Israel is an artificial construction. "A generation brought up in the blind faith in necessity-of history or economy or society or nature-found it difficult to understand that precisely this artificiality gave the Jewish achievements in Palestine their human significance." 64 Her exalted view of politics explains Arendt's strange theory of territorial jurisdiction. Recall her assertion that territory refers not to a "piece of land" but to "the space between individuals in a group" where they fashion their common life.
All political constructions are artificial: they result from human action which imbues them with meaning. Their artificiality is the source of, not an objection to, their value. In Arendt's famous triad of human activities-labor, work, and action-it is the last, political action, that displays the basic human condition of plurality. frequently invokes the concept of an in-between space (or, as she sometimes calls it, a "space of appearance") as the location of politics. 66 It follows that Arendt would strongly reject Lemkin's theoretical basis for defining separate crimes of genocide and extermination, namely the special value he assigned to groups "as such." Given the value Arendt places on politics, it is safe to say that she would have likewise objected to the still-controversial exclusion of political groups from the list of protected groups in the legal definition of genocide; in an important sense, she would have argued that political groups are the only ones that have value "as such."
V. The Banality of Evil
We come finally to the banality of evil, the signature concept of EJ. The phrase "banality of evil" appears only twice in Eichmann in Jerusalem-once, with no explication, in the text, and once in the subtitle. In 1971 Arendt explained that the phrase refers to 66 See, e.g., Arendt, supra note 1, pp. 198-99 (on the polis as "space of action" or "space of appearance"). 67 I agree with her. David Luban, 'Calling Genocide By Its Rightful Name: Lemkin's Word, Darfur, and the U.N. Report', 7 Chicago Journal of International Law (2006) pp. 303-20. no theory or doctrine but something quite factual, the phenomenon of evil deeds, committed on a gigantic scale, which could not be traced to any particularity of wickedness, pathology, or ideological conviction in the doer, whose only personal distinction was a perhaps extraordinary shallowness. However monstrous the deeds were, the doer was neither monstrous nor demonic, and the only specific characteristic one could detect in his past as well as in his behavior during the trial and the preceding police examination was something entirely negative: it was not stupidity but a curious, quite authentic inability to think. 68 In EJ she uses the final phrase with a significant addition: "inability to think, namely, to think from the standpoint of somebody else." 69 She elaborates the idea that thinking requires adopting multiple points of view in her late philosophy of mind, where she distinguishes this ability from intelligence, and connects thinking both with personal identity and with the capacity for moral judgment. 70 In the posthumously-published Life of the Mind, Arendt explains that our tradition attributes evil to any number of things: the pride of Lucifer, the resentment and selfloathing of Richard III, the envy of Cain, the weakness of Macbeth, the depraved hatred of Iago or Claggart, the covetousness and cupidity that we are told is the "root of all evil."
Arendt's ideas are philosophically rich, but this is not the place to discuss them. "clichés, stock phrases, adherence to conventional, standardized codes of expression and conduct" that "have the socially recognized function of protecting us against reality, that is, against the claim on our thinking attention that all events and facts make by virtue of their existence." 72 It is unfortunate that Arendt waited to define "banality of evil," EJ's most misunderstood phrase. Arendt's critics have variously supposed her to have meant that Eichmann was legally or morally innocent of his crimes (despite her insistence that Eichmann was "one of the greatest criminals of that period" This is what she means by Eichmann's inability to think. 73 ); or that all of us are potential Eichmanns or just as guilty as Eichmann (despite her explicit statements to the contrary 74 ); or that mass murder is banal, at least to refined intellectuals such as herself (despite the fact that she had devoted her career to thinking about little else); or that Eichmann's fault lay in stupidity (despite her elaborate efforts to distinguish thought from intellect and thoughtlessness from stupidity 75 Arendt always denied that she was writing "a theoretical treatise on the nature of evil"; she insisted that it was only a trial report, and that "when I speak of the banality of evil, I do so only on the strictly factual level …."
). Perhaps this is why she neglected to define the term. In private correspondence with McCarthy, she reiterated that she had no 73 Arendt, supra note 6, p. 288. 74 Ibid., p. 296. 75 76 Arendt, supra note 6, pp. 285, 287. See also Arendt, supra note 71, p. 3. The term "trial report" is in Arendt, supra note 6, p. 280. empirical, not philosophical (although whether Eichmann himself fit the diagnosis or simply fooled Arendt is a different question). 86 The "banal" perpetrator is, at bottom, a moral chameleon whose values conform themselves to their environment. Lacking "an unequivocal voice of conscience," 87 he equates right with normal and wrong with exceptional. 88 In a decent polity, this confusion generally stands him in good stead. Disaster results when a criminal regime turns morality upside down and inverts ordinary legal rules and exceptions. Those are the circumstances in which everyday banality transmutes into the banality of evil. In Arendt's account, the banality of evil and state criminality fit together as cognate concepts. 89 The question is what legal significance the banality of evil has. One possible answer is that it has no significance: banality of evil refers to the perpetrator's motives, and motives are irrelevant in criminal law. Mens rea deals with intent and knowledge, not motive, and nobody suggested that Eichmann acted unintentionally or lacked knowledge of what he was doing or the consequences to his victims. Arendt asserts that "in all modern legal systems … intent to do wrong is necessary for the commission of a crime." 90 subset of crimes-generally either purely regulatory (mala prohibita) offenses, or those specific intent (dolus specialis) crimes whose statutes specify knowledge of the act's illegality as an element. As for intent to do moral wrong or knowledge that one's act is morally wrong, neither are legal requirements for criminal conviction, and neither belongs to the legal concept of mens rea.
On the other hand, consider the defense of superior orders and mistake of law in the Rome Statute. It relieves a defendant of liability if: (1) the defendant was ordered to commit the crime and lay under a "legal obligation to obey" the order; (2) the defendant "did not know that the order was unlawful"; and (4) "[t]he order was not manifestly unlawful." 91 Eichmann had his orders, and to his knowledge they were legally obligatory under the Nazi doctrine Führerworte haben Gesetzeskraft-for no one doubted that A stipulation is no answer. Arendt is clearly correct that the "plausibility" of such an answer "rests on the assumption that the law expresses 92 Arendt, supra note 6, pp. 24, 128. 93 Rome Statute, supra note 91, art. 33(2). only what every man's conscience would tell him anyhow" 94 This is the biggest challenge that Arendt poses to international criminal law.
When faced with a criminal state, and "banal" perpetrators who recognize evil only when it deviates from prevailing norms, the basis for criminal punishment must somehow be severed from subjective mens rea.
-in other words, that intent to commit these acts is intent to do wrong.
This perhaps explains Arendt's preoccupation with the hostis generis humanii.
Eichmann may have lacked subjective awareness of guilt, but that made him no less the enemy of humanity. "Because he had been implicated and played a central role in an enterprise whose open purpose was to eliminate forever certain 'races' from the surface of the earth, he had to be eliminated." 95 Unfortunately, the label hostis generis humanii creates as many problems as it solves-not least Schmitt's concern that it makes the perpetrator "a monster who must not only be defeated but also utterly destroyed." 96 Arendt never came up with a satisfactory conception of objective culpability, nor did she claim to. In the Eichmann case, she believed that the Jerusalem judges "really passed judgment solely on the basis of the monstrous deeds" rather than the legal standards and precedents they cited in their opinion. 97 In her eyes, this was a good thing. 98 94 Arendt, supra note 6, p. 293; see also p. 148.
But that is a 95 Ibid., p. 277. 96 Schmitt, supra note 25, p. 36. Cicero wrote in De Officiis that "we have no ties of fellowship with a tyrant, but rather the bitterest feud ... [T]hose fierce and savage monsters in human form should be cut off from what may be called the common body of humanity." Cicero, supra note 40, p. 299, III.vi.32. 97 Arendt, supra note 6, p. 294. 98 Arendt's major preoccupation in the last decade of her life was an analysis of judgment and the central place it occupies among our mental and moral faculties. At Arendt's death, the title page with epigraphs of her unwritten book on judgment, the capstone of her trilogy on the life of the mind, was in her typewriter. troubling thought for jurists, who mistrust "kadi justice" that passes judgment freely on the facts. 99 Notwithstanding her complaint that the court buried the unprecedented under a flood of precedents, Arendt knew it too, and she understood that no court can simply bypass eight hundred years of criminal jurisprudence linking culpability with mens rea.
In the sole passage in EJ where she explains the basis of Eichmann's culpability in the absence of subjective awareness of wrongdoing, she writes:
Jurists know that legal tools are the only ones they possess.
We refuse, and consider as barbaric, the propositions "that a great crime offends nature, so that the very earth cries out for vengeance; that evil violates a natural harmony which only retribution can restore; that a wronged collectivity owes a duty to the moral order to punish the criminal" (Yosal Rogat). And yet I think it is undeniable that it was precisely on the ground of these long-forgotten propositions that Eichmann was brought to justice to begin with, and that they were, in fact, the supreme justification for the death penalty. 100 There is a striking ambivalence in this passage. As we saw, Arendt's critique of culpability resting on subjective mens rea drives her (and us) toward these "longforgotten propositions," and the final words in the passage make it sound as though she accepts them as "supreme justification" for the verdict. On the other hand, we "refuse, and consider as barbaric" those very propositions. 101 99 "We do not sit like a kadi under a tree, dispensing justice according to considerations of individual expediency." Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 11 (19)(Frankfurter, J. dissenting).
When she summarizes her 100 Arendt, supra note 6, p. 254. 101 Of course "the very earth cries out for vengeance" comes from God's words to Cain in Genesis 4:10, "your brother's blood cries out from the earth." complaints about the Eichmann trial, they are at bottom legal complaints, not complaints about legality:
In sum, the failure of the Jerusalem court consisted in its not coming to grips with three fundamental issues, all of which have been sufficiently well known and widely discussed since the establishment of the Nuremberg Tribunal: the problem of impaired justice in the court of the victors; a valid definition of the "crime against humanity"; and a clear recognition of the new criminal who commits this crime. 102 Comparing Arendt's initial enthusiasm for the Eichmann trial in her first letter to Jaspers with the far more subdued postscript to EJ, it seems clear that she had become chastened watching the trial unfold. Perhaps she could not decide whether the problem was a remediable defect in the Jerusalem proceedings or a fundamental mismatch between the law and the crime. All the questions she asked remain with us today, and they remain the biggest questions international criminal law must answer. 103 
